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WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION: TOWARD A
STRICTER LIABILITY FOR
ENTERPRISE
The industrialization which occurred during the nineteenth century provided a major stimulus for the adoption of the negligence
theory of tort liability.1 Once this process of industrialization was
complete, a system of enterprise liability apart from the general
law of torts began to develop. 2 This emergent system, anchored to
the basic principles of deterrence and risk-spreading, 3 diverged
from the concept of negligence most notably in two fields closely
tied to the manufacturing process-workmen's compensation and
products liability. 4 As a result of their reliance on the theory of
liability without fault, these two branches of the law have provided relief for the injured party in an efficient manners Problems can arise, however, when these two theories are invoked
concurrently, and recovery is sought against both the employer
who is traditionally liable according to negligence theory and the
' W. PROSSER, THE LAW OF TORTS § 28, at 140 (4th ed. 1971) [hereinafter cited as
PROSSER]; Gregory, Trespass to Negligence to Absolute Liability, 37 VA. L. REV. 359
(1951); Winfield, The History of Negligence in the Law of Torts, 42 L. Q. REV. 184, 195
(1926).
2 As Professor Green describes the change:
Liability of the enterpriser for negligence has been broadened immeasurably
and his immunities have either been removed altogether or have at least
suffered severe modifications. The reaction presents a jagged front, neither
extension of liability or modification of defense is the same in any two areas
of litigation, and certainly not in different jurisdictions.
Green, Should the Manufacturer of General Products be Liable Without Negligence?, 24
TENN.
L. REV. 928, 931 (1957).
3
See F. HARPER & F. JAMES, THE LAW OF TORTS §§ 11.4(3), 12.4(3), 13.2 (1956), for
a discussion of deterrence and distribution of risk; Witte, The Theory of Workmen's
Compensation, 20 AM. LAB. LEG. REV. 411 (1930). For a general discussion of the
deterrent results of liability insurance, see James, Accident Liability Reconsidered: The
Impact of Liability Insurance, 57 YALE L.J. 549, 559 (1948).
4 The interplay between the developments in the areas of workmen's compensation and
products liability is summarized by Justice Roger J. Traynor in Ways and Meanings of
Defective Products and Strict Liability, 32 TENN. L. REV. 363, 375 (1965):
The development of strict liability for defective products, for industrial injuries covered by workmen's compensation and for injuries caused by ultra-hazardous activities, presages the abandonment of long-standing concepts
of fault in accident cases. The significant innovations in products liability
may well be carried over to such cases.
See also Kalven, Torts: The Quest for Appropriate Standards, 53 CALIF. L. REV. 189,
205-06 (1965).
5 McCoid, The Third Person in the Compensation Picture-A Study of the Liabilities
and Rights of Non-Employers, 37 TEXAS L. REV. 389, 401 (1959).
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manufacturer who is liable to the injured employee on a claim of
products liability.

6

This article considers the situation in which an employee injured by a defective product in the course of his employment can
proceed both against his employer insured by a workmen's compensation program and against a manufacturer of the employer's
equipment who is strictly liable under a claim of products liability.
The focus is not on the manufacturer as employer but on the
manufacturer as supplier of defective equipment which causes
injury. This is the best situation for analyzing the problems arising
from the present system for distributing losses because, where the
negligence of the employer has been an independent cause of the
workman's injury, the equities pertaining to the apportionment of
damages are evenly balanced. 7 Traditional tort theory would denominate the employer and manufacturer joint tortfeasors. 8 Both
are in a position to spread the cost of any recovery to those with
whom they deal. Moreover, no element of sympathy enhances the
position of either the employer or the manufacturer. 9 A study of

this situation points to grave inequities, 10 judicial dissatisfaction,11
and a need for legislative reevaluation of the structure of the
12
current enterprise liability system.

6

A. EHRENZWEIG, TRENDS TOWARD AN ENTERPRISE LIABILITY FOR INSURABLE Loss:

NEGLIGENCE WITHOUT FAULT § 16, at 55 (195 1) [hereinafter cited as EHRENZWEIG].
7 Professor Larson calls the general question of apportionment of loss between a third
party and negligent employer "[p]erhaps the most evenly-balanced controversy in all of
compensation law." 2 A. LARSON, THE LAW OF WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION § 76.10, at
227 (1970) [hereinafter cited as LARSON].
8
The definition of joint tortfeasors has been expanded for use in this situation:
At one time [the term joint tortfeasors] was applied only to persons who
acted in unison or concert to inflict injury or damage, but today it is generally
considered to be applicable "in all cases where there is joint liability for a
tort, whether the acts of those jointly liable were concerted, merely concurrent or even successive in point of time."
Note, Contribution and Indemnity: The Effect of Workmen's Compensation Acts, 42 VA.
L. REV. 959, 959-60 (1956), quoting Leflar, Contribution and Indemnity Between Tortfeasors, 81 U. PA. L. REV. 130, 131 n.9 (1932). For the definition of joint tortfeasors as
set forth in the UNIFORM CONTRIBUTION AMONG JOINT TORTFEASORs ACT, see note 89
infra.
9
[T]here is no 'injured' person to protect, since the employer's contribution to
the compensation coverage or direct payment of compensation for his employees is recognized as one of the normal expenses of his enterprise. On the
other hand, the third person.., has engaged in conduct which is unreasonable and can scarcely be treated as an innocent injured party.
McCoid, supra note 5, at 45 1.
"°Seenotes 54-65 and accompanying text infra.
11 See notes 66-98 aud accompanying text infra.
12See notes 100-22 and accompanying text infra.
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WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION THEORY

At the beginning of this century it became apparent that the
traditional bases of tort liability, particularly the concept of negligence, often led to inadequate protection of workmen in the
course of their employment. Some of the industrial accidents
which occurred could not be traced to any fault on the part of the
employer.1 3 Moreover, even when fault could be found, "the three

wicked sisters of the common law" -contributory

negligence, as-

sumption of risk, and the fellow-servant rule-often precluded
recovery.!4 The laws enacting programs for workmen's compensation were a reaction to this inability of the employee to
obtain judicial relief. 15 By providing a guaranteed recovery to the
injured worker, 16 these programs rejected the belief that a
worker's wages were adequate compensation for the risks he
17
encountered.
In so providing for a recovery, workmen's compensation programs maintained a number of the social functions that had been
performed by a tort law based on negligence. Legislatures, hypothesizing that the cost of industrial accidents, whether avoidable or not, was a cost of doing business, 8 placed the financial
13 Liability for negligence without fault, the basic liability in the scheme of social
insurance
may be said to include injuries which, being typical for the particular enterprise, could have reasonably been foreseen (though not avoided without
abandoning the enterprise) by the entrepreneur when starting his activity.
EHRENZWEIG, supra note 6, § 16, at 61.
14 PROSSER, supra note 1, § 80, at 531. See also S. HOROWITZ, INJURY AND DEATH
UNDER WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION LAWS 1-4 (1944); Ives v. South Buffalo Ry., 201
N.Y. 271, 288-92, 94 N.E. 431, 437-39 (1912), in which the Court of Appeals, in the
course of holding the first New York workmen's compensation act unconstitutional,
acknowledged the ability of the legislature to restrict the operation of these doctrines.
15 Professor Gregory has said that the workmen's compensation acts do not apply only
to situations involving extrahazardous conduct, but rather
undertake merely to place on industry the losses sustained by workers on
their jobs as a consequence of the ordinary risks of their employment,
without regard to fault or negligence.
Gregory, supra note 1, at 385. See also Note, Workmen's Compensation Acts: Their
Theory and Their Constitutionality, 25 HARV. L. REV. 129, 130- 34 (1911).
16 The imposition of absolute liability upon the employer is tempered by the limitations
upon the extent of his liability under the acts:
[W]orkmen's compensation laws effectively strike a balance between quick
and certain recovery for the employee, in return for which the employer's
liability is limited by statute. In this manner, the socially desirable policy of
compensating industrial injuries can be carried out with the industries themselves bearing the burden, or transferring the cost to society in general.
Comment, Workmen's Compensation:The Impact of the Witt v. Jackson Rule on the Law
of Third Party Settlements, 17U.C.L.A.L. REV. 651, 653 (1970).
17Note, supra note 15, at 130.
18
The court in Union Iron Works v. Industrial Accident Comm'n, 190 Cal. 33, 39, 210
P. 410, 413 (1922), awarding an injured employee the cost of an operation that his
employer's doctors felt unnecessary, said that
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burden of the program on those consumers who had benefited by
the work of the injured party.1 9 Slight price increases would then
cover this cost of business. Furthermore, the workmen's compensation system imposed absolute liability on the employer, thus
creating a certain deterrent effect. Presumably the industries
themselves would improve the working environment of their em20
ployees in order to minimize losses under the new statutes.
The absolute liability to which the enterprise was subject was
not fashioned upon common-law analogies. As Professor Freund
states,
[Tihe essence of the new law was that it did not attempt to
redress acts or omissions, but to relieve a situation,
not, .. . upon an arbitrary basis, but upon a new principle
which perhaps should be designated as that of social soli21
darity.
The upper limit of the employer's liability was fixed by law,
usually as a proportion of the worker's wages, and was dependent
upon the severity of the disability.2 2 This recovery was not to
compensate for the damages suffered by the workman but rather
was intended to redress only his lost earning ability.2 3 Thus full
tort recovery was sacrificed on the assumption that the injured
party would not become a burden to society. 4 This limited measure of recovery struck a balance between the present need for a
certain recovery and the intended result of the common-law tort

The underlying principle upon which the Workmen's Compensation Act
rests ... emanates from the economic thought that personal injury losses
incident to an industry is a part of the costs of production, to be borne, just as
the depreciation and replacement of a machine is borne, by the industry
itself, which compensation will be included in the cost of the product of the
industry.
19 The most colorful statement of this belief is that credited to Lloyd George: "The cost
of the product should bear the blood of the workman." PROSSER, supra note I, § 80, at
530. This phrase is also echoed by Justice Traynor in his opinion in Witt v. Jackson, 57
Cal. 2d 57, 71, 17 Cal. Rptr. 369, 377, 366 P.2d 641, 649 (1961), in which California
adopted a minority position, denying the employer the means by which he could escape the
cost of the employee's workmen's compensation award. See text accompanying notes
86-88 infra.
20 2 F. HARPER & F. JAMES, supra note 3, at §§ 11.4(3), 12.4(3); James, supra note 3, at
559; James & Dickinson, Accident Proneness and Accident Law, 63 HARv. L. REV. 769,
779-82 (1951); McCoid, supra note 5, at 398-400.
21

E. FREUND, STANDARDS OF AMERICAN LEGISLATION 110 (1931). See also Larson,

The Welfare State and Workmen's Compensation, 5 NACCA L.J. 18-24 (1950).
22 Millender, Expanding Employee's Remedies and Third Party Actions, 17 CLEV.-MAR.
L. REV. 32, 32-33 (1968); Union Iron Works v. Industrial Accident Commission, 190
Cal. 33, 39, 210 P. 410, 413 (1922).
23 See Brodie, The Adequacy of Workmen's Compensation as Social Insurance: A
Review of Developments and Proposals, 1963 Wis. L. REV. 57, 81-84.
24 I LARSON, supra note 7, § 2.40, at 10.
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remedy, i.e., making the injured party whole by compensating him
25
for pain and suffering as well as lost earning potential.
To counterbalance the imposition on the employer of absolute
liability, any award under the workmen's compensation system
works to destroy any other causes of action against the employer
arising out of the same injury, regardless of whether the employer
was at fault.2 6 Professor Larson describes this protection afforded
the employer as having two bases. 2 7 First, workmen's compensation statutes themselves typically impose a specific bar to
suits on the basis of the injury not only by the employee and his
dependents, but by "any other person" as well. 2 8 Additionally,
Larson cites a second, more theoretical, basis that since the
employer has undertaken liability for all injuries, the duty of the
employer to exercise due care towards his employee becomes
legally irrelevant. Once the employer is relieved of this duty, it
follows that he cannot violate it, and that a basis for common-law
29
tort liability no longer exists.
This bar to subsequent actions does not protect any third party,
such as a manufacturer whose defective product may have contributed to the workman's injury?" Since the third party did not
25 While reparation has never been made for pain and suffering under workmen's compensation programs, other forms of noneconomic damages have been allowed:
Thus there are compromises of the compensation principle in the form of
benefits awarded in some states for disfigurement, schedule benefits for
certain disabilities without proof of wage loss, extra payments for workers
injured through their employers' violation of safety regulations and for minors injured while unlawfully employed, and special benefits for rehabilitation.
Brodie,
supra note 23, at 81.
26
See, e.g., Federal Employee's Compensation Act, 5 U.S.C. § 8116(c) (1970); ILL.
REV. STAT. ch. 48, § 138.5(a) (1971); MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 411.4 (1967); MINN.
STAT. ANN. § 176.031 (1966).
27 2 LARSON, supra note 7, § 76.22, at 245.
28 For example, note the language of the Federal Employee's Compensation Act, 5
U.S.C. §8116(c) (1970):
The liability of the United States or an instrumentality thereof under this
subchapter or any extension thereof with respect to the injury or death of an
employee is exclusive and instead of all other liability of the United States or
the instrumentality to the employee, his legal representative, spouse, dependents, next of kin, and any other person otherwise entitled to recover damages from the United States or the instrumentality because of the injury or
death ....

(emphasis added)

See, Busey v. Washington, 225 F. Supp. 416, 424 (D.D.C. 1964), in which the court
refused to require contribution from the United States in a suit involving an injured post
office worker, stating that "the exclusive liability provision of the Compensation Act
constitutes a legal bar to the recovery of contribution from the United States by the
third-party
plaintiff herein." See also 2 LARSON, supra note 7, § 76.22, at 245.
29

id.

30 Professor McCoid states that

The preponderant view is to deny [contribution] to the third person against
the immediate employer on the ground that there is no common or joint
liability since the employer's obligation to provide compensation arises pure-
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pay any part of the workmen's compensation premiums, his liability is not limited by the statute. The injured workman may therefore seek to recover from the third party damages in excess of his
lost earning capacity l Here also the protection afforded to the
employer by the dual foreclosure cited by Larson is significant.
Since the express provisions of most statutes preclude any attempt by a third-party tortfeasor to join the employer for contribution or indemnity, the employer is afforded strong protection
against involvement in the third-party tort suit.3 2 Even in the
absence of a statutory bar, courts have held that because the
initial liability of the employer was absolute and not derived from
common-law negligence, the employer cannot be a joint tortfeasor.3 3 Thus, under common-law doctrine the manufacturer cannot

recover from the employer in the absence of some independent
obligation? 4 Such an obligation might occur when the employer
has released the manufacturer from any liability resulting from
35
misuse of the machinery, a suitation that virtually never occurs.
Furthermore, the workmen's compensation laws of all but two
ly from his status and attaches without proof of fault and without reference to
common law damage principles while the third person's liability is dependent
upon some "fault" and had no prescribed bounds.
McCoid, supra note 5, at 437.
31 The first workmen's compensation statutes excluded suits by the injured worker
against third parties. WASH. LAWS ch. 74, § 1 (1911); MONT. LAWS, ch. 96, § 3(d) (1915).
Today all American compensation systems recognize the retention of the common law
rights of the employee against parties whose liability is not determined by the statute.
McCoid, supra note 5, at 395.
32 See Yale & Towne Mfg. Co. v. J. Ray McDermott Co., 347 F.2d 371 (5th Cir. 1965),
a suit by an employee injured while using a defective hoist, in which the court refused to
allow a claim by the manufacturer against the employer on an allegation that the employer
had failed to provide a safe place to work. In Bankers Indem. Ins. Co. v. Cleveland
Hardware & Forging Co., 77 Ohio App. 316, 62 N.E.2d 180, appeal dismissed, 145 Ohio
St. 615, 62 N.E.2d 251 (1945), the court held that an employer who had paid the
workmen's compensation award was not liable for contribution in that amount to the third
party whose negligence had resulted in the explosion of a tank of oxygen.
33 See cases discussed in note 32 supra. For a different result, predicated upon the
UNIFORM CONTRIBUTION AMONG JOINT TORTFEASORS ACT, see Maio v. Fahs, 339 Pa.

180, 14 A.2d 105 (1940), in which the court held that the employee's recovery against the
third party was limited to the amount of the judgment less the amount of the workmen's
compensation award. See generally text accompanying note 103 infra.
34 2 LARSON, supra note 7, § 76, at 227, and § 76.44, at 250.78. In Diamond State Tel.
Co. v. University of Delaware, 269 A.2d 52, 56 (Del. Super. 1970), the University was
allowed to bring an action for indemnity against the employer phone company on the basis
of an implied contract to do the work on its property in a careful and prudent manner. In
Dale v. Whiteman, 36 Mich. App. 533, 193 N.W.2d 911 (1971), a similar result was
reached when the court found that the owner of a carwash owed an independent duty to
the owner of a vehicle to operate the vehicle through the carwash in a careful manner.
3 As Larson points out, to expect to find such a reverse warranty in ordinary commercial dealings would "be stretching the concept of contract out of all relation to reality."
2 LARSON, supra note 7, § 76.44, at 250.84. See also McClish v. Niagara Machine & Tool
Works, 266 F. Supp. 987, 991 (D. Ind. 1967), in which the court rejected the manufacturer's theory that the employer's representation that the machine would be operated
pursuant to certain safety standards created a duty to indemnify the manufacturer.
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states3 6 subrogate the employer to the claim of his employee
against a third party, regardless of whether the employer shares
any blame for the injury.3 7 The effect of this statutory subrogation
is to associate the interests of the employer with those of his
employee. The employer will proceed against the manufacturer on
a claim of strict liability. Even though the employer may be
equally at fault for the injury, he may recover the cost of the
workmen's compensation award paid to the injured worker, thus
38
passing the entire cost onto the manufacturer.
II. PRODUCTS LIABILITY THEORY

A similar development in personal injury cases has increased
the liability of manufacturers. During the nineteenth century, the
general theory of negligence and the doctrine of privity worked to
deny recovery against manufacturers for injuries resulting from
the use of their products and services. These judicial results
furthered the social policy of limiting the liability of the enterprise.39 Once industrialization became firmly established, how36
OHIo REV. CODE ANN. §§ 4123.01-99 (1965), as amended, (Supp. 1971); W. VA.
CODE ANN. §§ 23-I-1 et seq. (1970). New Hampshire formerly adhered to the prohibition
against subrogation until a new workmen's compensation law was enacted in 1947. N. H.
REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 281:1 et seq. (1966), as amended, (Supp. 1971).
3 The theories enabling the employer to bring suit on the employee's rights vary from
state to state. In Lovette v. Lloyd, 236 N.C. 663,668, 73 S.E.2d 886, 891 (1953) the court
said:
The employer or the insurance carrier, who has paid or become obligated to
pay compensation to the employee injured by the negligent third party, has
the exclusive right in the first instance to commence an action "in his own
name and/or in the name of the injured employee .... "
In Marciniak v. Pennsylvania R.R., 152 F. Supp. 89, 91 (D. Del. 1957), the court found
the subrogation provision of the workmen's compensation act to constitute a "grant to an
employer or insurer of the employee's right to proceed against a negligent third party."
The New Mexico Supreme Court noted in Royal Indem. Co. v. Southern Calif. Petroleum
Corp., 67 N.M. 137, 144, 353 P.2d 358, 363 (1960), regarding N.M. STAT. ANN.
§ 59- 10-25 (1953), that "there is but one cause of action, and the employer, or his insurer,
is specifically granted reimbursement in this single cause of action." For a discussion of
the actual mechanics of the subrogation procedure, see Note, Problems of Election Under
Workmen's Compensation Acts, 48 GEO. L. J. 761 (1960).
38Marciniak v. Pennsylvania R.R., 152 F. Supp. 89 (D. Del. 1957); WilliArms Bros.
Lumber Co. v. Meisel, 85 Ga. App. 72, 68 S.E.2d 384 (1951). In Indemnity Ins. Co. v.
Odom, 237 S.C. 167, 176-77, 116 S.E.2d 22, 27 (1960), the court reversed a holding that
the contributory negligence of the employer barred a recovery of the workmen's compensation award from the third-party recovery of the employee's widow, on the grounds
that the assignment of the cause of action was granted by statute rather than by the
principles of equitable restitution.
39 See generally Gregory, supra note 1. Although these protections may have been felt
necessary, a number of exceptions such as trespass, ultrahazardous activity, breach of
warranty, res ipsa loquitur, the "reasonable man" test, and respondeat superior soon
evolved to provide a measure of relief to the victims of enterprise. EHRENZWEIG, supra
note 6, § 2, at 10-11.
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ever, enterprises no longer needed to be favored with relaxed
rules of liability. 40 The apparent wealth of the corporate entities

and their ability to distribute the cost of industrial injuries stimulated a movement demanding a greater degree of responsibility for
injuries that resulted from their operations. 1 Gaining acceptance
in the last fifty years, this trend toward strict liability for the
manufacturer has been all but universally acknowledged as a
42
legitimate form of enterprise liability.
In holding a manufacturer liable to an injured worker, the
theory of strict liability in tort eliminates the necessity of proving
that the defect in the product which caused the injury was the
result of negligence.a4 The theory rests upon two social policies:
the desire to eliminate unnecessarily complicated suits by limiting
the role of the privity concept, 44 and a belief that
The public interest in human life, health, and safety demands
the maximum possible protection that the law can give
against dangerous defects in products ...[and] justifies the
imposition upon all suppliers of such products, of full responsibility for the harm they cause, even though the supplier has
45
not been negligent.
The injured party, therefore, need only show that his injury was
caused by the defect, that the defect was "unreasonably dan-

40 Gregory, supra note 1, at 396.

supra note 6, § 16, at 55.
Professor Green, supra note 2, at 937, states:
Whatever the doctrine, strict o.- less strict, it has its source in the maximum
protection that can be given through the courts to "we the people," and at the
same time not burden enterprise beyond its capacity to function. And in
affording this protection there has been steady progress throughout the last
half-century in providing safer products and in shifting the risks of enterprise
through insurance and price controls back to the consumers. In this
way.., no one is excessively burdened.
See also Prosser, The Fall of the Citadel (Strict Liability to the Consumer), 50 MINN. L.
REv. 791 (1966).
4Prosser, The Assault Upon the Citadel (Strict Liability to the Consumer), 69 YALE
L.J. 1099, 1114 (1960)'
4MacPherson v. Buick Motor Co., 217 N.Y. 382, 389, II1 N.E. 1050, 1053 (1916).
The court's holding that a manufacturer has liability to the consumer if the nature of the
product is such that it is "reasonably certain to place life and limb in peril when negligently
made" provided the exception to the doctrine of privity that eventually "swallow[ed] the
asserted general rule of nonliability, leaving nothing upon which that rule could operate."
Carter v. Yardley & Co., 319 Mass. 92, 103, 64 N.E.2d 693, 700 (1946). See also Peairs,
The God in the Machine, 29 BOST. U.L. REV. 37 (1949).
45 Prosser, supra note 43, at 1122. See also Escola v. Coca Cola Bottling Co., 24 Cal. 2d
453, 462, 150 P.2d 436, 441 (1944), in which Justice Traynor stated in concurrence that
the risk of the occurrence of injuries from the marketing of'defective products is "a
constant risk and a general one. Against such a risk there should be a general and constant
protection and the manufacturer is best situated to afford such protection."
41 EHRENZWEIG,
42
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gerous," and that the defect existed in the product at the time it
46
left the control of the manufacturer.
The party suing under a claim of strict products liability may
also benefit from the elimination of the manufacturer's defense of
contributory negligence in those cases where the plaintiff has
merely failed to discover the defect in the product or to guard
against its existence. 47 This inability of the manufacturer to pass
part of the liability onto a party who shares responsibility for the
cause of an accident has been extended to third-party situations.
In Fenton v. McCrory,48 where the manufacturer of a defective
product sought to join a third party who had used the product in a
negligent manner, thereby helping to cause the plaintiff's injury,
the court held that no right to contribution exists "between those
whose liability is imposed under different grounds." 49 The decision was based in part on the history of the rule of contribution
between tortfeasors in Pennsylvania, but a significant factor was
the court's belief that the burden of payment should be imposed
on the manufacturer regardless of the amount of due care exercised.5 0 Thus, by choosing to place the cost of injuries upon the
enterprise, which is better able to spread the costs throughout
society, and by refusing to allocate the costs according to degrees
of responsibility, the courts have shown a willingness to undercut
common-law ties in the interest of preserving the strictness of
enterprise liability.
Like workmen's compensation, the imposition of strict liability
is based upon both practical considerations and public policy.
These policy considerations include the deterrent effect of a
heightened level of responsibility placed on the manufacturer 5
and the ability of the manufacturer to distribute to those who
46 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 402A (1965); Prosser, supra note 43, at 1114.
Oddly enough, the part of the plaintiff's burden that has been eliminated, i.e., proof of
negligent manufacturing, is that part that is generally the easiest to prove. Id.

47 PROSSER, supra note 1, at 670. If the negligence involves using the defendant's
product in spite of a known danger, this defense will be applied, however, to relieve the
manufacturer of his liability. This form of contributory negligence, Prosser says, "overlaps
assumption of risk." Id. at 67 1. See also RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 402A,
comment (n) (1965).
4847 F.R.D. 260 (W.D. Pa. 1969).
49 Id. at 262.
50
1d.
51 Professor James notes that

[T]he manufacturer is in a peculiarly strategic position to improve the safety
of his products, so that the pressure of strict liability could scarcely be

exerted at a better point if accident prevention is to be furthered by tort law.
James, General Products-Should Manufacturers be Liable Without Negligence?, 24
TENN. L. REV. 923 (1957); See also James, Social Insurance and Tort Liability: The
Problem ofAlternative Remedies, 27 N.Y.U.L. REV. 537, 547 (1952).
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benefit from the products the cost of injuries resulting from defects. 52 Although the validity of the practical considerations is by
no means free from doubt,53 it is generally thought that considerations of policy support this form of enterprise liability.

111.

APPORTIONMENT OF THE RECOVERIES

A. Theoretical Interaction
There is great similarity apparent between the strict liability
imposed on the manufacturer of defective products and the liability borne by the employer under the workmen's compensation
statutes. The basic difference for present purposes lies in the fact
that strict liability, while eliminating the burden of proving negli54
gence, leaves the manufacturer under the auspices of tort law,
while the employer's liability is created by statute and is in5
dependent of the common law
While both theories manifest the highly laudable aim of
efficiently providing the injured party with compensation, there
has been no attempt to reconcile the two theories in situations
where they both allow for recovery. A leading authority on workmen's compensation has noted:
52 Professor James likens this to a process of "natural selection" whereby "matters of
indemnity and liability-over among potential defendants will be worked out in the way
dictated by the economic and bargaining positions of the various parties." James, General
Products, supra note 5 1, at 925. See also Jeanblanc, Manufacturers' Liability to Persons
Other than Immediate Vendees, 24 VA. L. REV. 134, 158 (1937).
53 See Plant, Strict Liability of Manufacturers for Injuries Caused by Defects in Products-An Opposing View, 24 TENN. L. REV. 938, 945-46 (1957); Prosser, supra note 43,
at 1119-22.
54 See note 46 and accompanying text supra.
55 See note 21 and accompanying text supra. To say that strict liability can be
differentiated from workmen's compensation because it is not statutory refers only to the
origins of the theory. In fact, certain codifications of the rule as it has evolved in the courts
have been quite influential. See Webb v. Zern, 422 Pa. 424, 220 A.2d 853 (1966), where
the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania adopted § 402A of the RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF
TORTS as "the law of Pennsylvania." Section 402A, entitled "Special Liability of Seller of
Product for Physical Harm to User or Consumer," states that
(1) One who sells any product in a defective condition unreasonably dangerous to the user or consumer or to his property is subject to liability for
physical harm thereby cause to the ultimate user or consumer, or to his
property, if
a) the seller is engaged in the business of selling such a product, and
b) it is expected to and does reach the user or consumer without substantial
change in the condition in which it is sold.
(2) The rule stated in Subsection (1) applies although
a) the seller has exercised all possible care in the preparation and sale of his
product, and
b) the user or consumer has not bought the product from or entered into any
contractual relation with the seller.
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[T]he distortions of our old-fashioned fault concepts that
have been thought advisable for reasons of social policy are
exclusively limited to providing an assured recovery for the
injured person; they have never gone on-once the injured
person was made whole-to change the rules on how the
56
ultimate burden was borne.

The resulting incongruities may be best illustrated in the situation
in which both the employer and the manufacturer, although not
having engaged in morally reprehensible conduct, are equally

responsible for the cause of the injury.5 7 Arguably, in this case
each is equally capable of spreading the cost of the recovery to
the consuming public as a part of the general cost of doing

business.
In spite of the balanced equities, and although both parties are
liable under the principles of enterprise liability which have superseded common-law negligence, the majority of courts has
reached a result typical of the common law: total victory for one
of the parties. 58 The employer is allowed to recover, the cost of his
workmen's compensation payments from the manufacturer by
subrogation to the rights of the employee. Although both the
manufacturer and the employer are independent causes of the
workman's injury, any attempt by the manufacturer to join the

employer as a joint tortfeasor is foreclosed by the terms of the
workmen's compensation statutes which bar suits by "any other

person," including suits for contribution 5 9
Any attempt to harmonize this harsh result with the principle
requiring that the burden of compensation be apportioned among

those at fault is futile.6 0 Indeed, if liability could be predicated
upon a failure to warn the injured employee of a defect, the
56 2 LARSON, supra note 7, § 71.10, at 165.
57

This is the difference between what Ehrenzweig categorizes as "moral negligence"
and "negligence without fault"-"the difference between the censure of reprehensible
conduct, on the one hand, and a liability for the unavoidable and insurable consequences of
lawful [enterprise] activities on the other hand." EHRENZWEIG, supra note 6, § 16, at 61.
58 As Professor Larson states:
The disadvantage of most dispositions of this total problem is one that is
characteristic of the common-law system: the inability to share a loss adjustment because of the legal imperative of granting total victory to plaintiff or
defendant. Thus, the usual rule that contribution by the negligent employer is
impossible ... is too absolute a victory for the employer, who actually comes
out ahead by being reimbursed for his compensation outlay.
2 LARSON,
supra note 7, § 76.22, at 250.9.
59
1d. § 76, at 227. See also notes 27-29 and accompanying text supra.
60 Professor Larson is of the opinion that every well-conceived loss-adjusting mechanism has two main aims in that "it must make the injured person whole, and it must also
seek out the true wrongdoer whenever possible." Id. § 71.10, at 165. See also EHRENZWEIG, supra note 6, § 2, at 9.

FALL

1972]

Workmen's Compensation

employer would be seen as the more culpable of the two parties,
since the defective product was in use under his supervision. 61
Instead, he may avoid any financial loss by means of subroga62
tion.
This result also frustrates the fulfillment of policies behind
enterprise liability. The employer in this situation has passed the
costs of injuries arising out of his business entirely onto the
manufacturer through the means of subrogation and the bar to
suits for contribution. Thus, under some circumstances, the
cost-spreading ability of the system may be diminished by the
restriction of costs to one level of industry. Furthermore, there is
no corresponding savings in the administration of this supposedly
efficient system because in the majority of cases in which such a
situation would arise, both parties are already in court. The manufacturer would be the defendant in the products liability suit
brought by the employee, and the employer would be active as the
subrogee of his workman. 63 Additionally, the deterrent force
ceases to be wholly significant in the location where that force can
be most effective-at the place of employment.6 4 In jurisdictions
permitting the employer to recover in excess of the costs for
which he is statutorily liable as an incentive to subrogate and sue
on behalf of the injured workman,6 the deterrent force of the
workmen's compensation acts is negligible.
B. JudicialAttempts to Apportion Recoveries
The arbitrary results produced by the interaction between the
tort liability of a third party and the statutory liability of an
61 The importance of the user's ability to detect defects in the product with which he
works has had an important impact outside of that area where the bar of workmen's
compensation applies. It is here where a seemingly lesser standard of strict liability has
been applied (see Green, supra note 2, at 932-33) and where strict liability may be
countered by the defense of contributory negligence (see Prosser, supra note 43, at 1148).
62 See note 58 supra.
63 The actual mechanics of the subrogation procedure vary according to the provisions
of the state workmen's compensation acts. For a discussion of the types of statutes, see
Note, Problems of Election Under Workmen's Compensation Acts, 48 GEO. L.J. 761
(1960).
64 As Green points out, the manufacturer
may give the most explicit directions and warnings but those who service or
use the machine may disregard the directions or tinker with the mechanism
or put it under a strain it was not designed to meet or otherwise subject it to
abuse. There is no such thing as a mechanical product safe for very long in
the hands of someone who does not know how to use it or who attempts to
use it for a purpose for which it was not designed.
Green, supra note 2, at 933.
r The workmen's compensation statute in New York provides that when the employer's
insurance carrier recovers a judgment from the third party in excess of the cost of the
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employer have not gone unnoticed by the courts. While a majority
of jurisdictions acknowledges the existence of a statutory right of
subrogation by the employer,8 6 some courts have demonstrated
''an aversion to recognizing third-party liability to the employer
except where expressly recognized." 6 7 Recovery thus has been
denied where the statute of limitations terminated the right to sue

in tort before the right of subrogation arose in the employer, 68 as
well as where the cause of action for the wrongful death of the
employee expired with the death of the employee's widow before
69
the employer could bring suit.
The decision of the United States Supreme Court in Federal
Marine Terminals, Inc. v. Burnside Shipping Co.70 is contrary to
these cases to the extent that it holds that the statutory provision
of the right of subrogation is an aid to the employer rather than a
limitation upon his rights. 7 1 Burnside did not involve a products
liability claim but instead arose out of the death of a stevedore
and the payment of compensation to the workman's estate under
72
the Longshoremen's and Habor Workers' Compensation Act.

The widow filed a wrongful death claim against the shipowner
who sought indemnification from the employer on the basis of an
workmen's compensation award, the carrier is entitled to keep one-third of the excess.
N.Y. WORKMEN'S COMP. § 29(2) (McKinney 1965). See also Atleson, Third Party Actions
and the Apportionment ofAttorney's Fees, 19 BUFFALO L. REV.515, 542-43 (1970).
56 Sec note 37 supra.

67 Larson, Workmen's Compensation Employer's Independent Action Against Third
Party, 27 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 223, 232 (1970).
68
Liberty Mutual Ins. Co. v. United States, 290 F.2d 257 (2d Cir. 1961). This case
arose under Section 33 of the Longshoremen's and Harbor Workers' Compensation Act,
33 U.S.C. §§ 901-950 (1970).
69
Murray v. Dewar, 6 Wis. 2d 41 ,94 N.W.2d 635 (1959). See generally Larson, supra
note 67, at 226- 31.
70 394 U.S. 404 (1969). The case involved a suit under the Longshoremen's and Harbor
Workers' Compensation Act, 33 U.S.C. §§ 901-950 (1970), by the widow of a stevedore
who was killed when he fell into an unprotected tank on the respondent's vessel. The
Supreme Court overturned the lower court's findings that the employer had breached its
warranty to perform the work in "a safe, workmanlike and seamanlike manner," that this
breach gave rise to a duty of indemnity by the employer, and that no duty of due care ran
from the shipowner to the employer such as would allow a counter-claim for indemnity
back.
71
The Court stated:
Nothing on the face of § 33 of the Act purports to limit the employer's
remedy against third persons to subrogation to the rights of the deceased
employee's representative ....
...Neither this Court nor, before this case, any other court has held that
statutory subrogation is the employer's exclusive remedy against third party
wrongdoers and we decline to so hold today.
394 U.S. at 412- 14. Although this case was decided under maritime law, the applicable
statute here, the Longshoremen's and Harbor Worker's Compensation Act, also serves as
the workmen's compensation act for the District of Columbia. D.C. CODE ANN. § 36-50 I
(1967).
72 33 U.S.C. §§ 901-950 (1970).
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alleged duty to perform its services in a "safe, workmanlike and
seamanlike manner." 73 The employer counterclaimed against the
shipowner on the basis of a duty to provide a safe place for the
stevedores to work. 74 Thus, although the action arose out of a
desire by the parties to shift the burdens of payment that were
imposed by the workmen's compensation statute, the factual situation is unlike anything likely to be encountered where a products
liability claim would arise.75 The district court 76 and the court of

appeals 7 7 disallowed the action by the employer to pass the workmen's compensation costs to the shipowner on the basis of a duty
to provide a safe place of employment, holding that the right of
subrogation to the wrongful death action that the Longshoremen's
and Harbor Workers' Compensation Act provides constituted the
employer's sole remedy. The Supreme Court reversed that holding, stating that "the legislative grant of a new right does not
ordinarily cut off or preclude other nonstatutory rights in the
absence of clear language to that effect." 7 8 By allowing a cause of
action for the shifting of workmen's compensation costs to be
based on a right existing outside of the statute itself, the Court
provided a means for a greater degree of interplay of claims and
counterclaims between the third party and the employer. This
would be especially valuable to workmen's compensation carriers
in cases like Burnside where the potential statutory liability of the
employer exceeds that of the third party. 79
Although the result in Burnside may have resulted in the full
financial burden of the accident being placed upon one party, the
decision should not be construed as opposing the view that there
should be some sort of apportionment between the parties who
are jointly liable to the injured worker. Considering the existence
of the shipowner's indemnity claim, the case may well exemplify a
feeling by the Court that the costs of enterprise should be able to
be distributed as freely as possible.8 0
The courts of the two states which do not provide statutory
73 394 U.S. at 409.
74

Id.

75 See note 35 supra, in which it is pointed out that it would be unusual for the employer
to warrant the safety of his actions to the third party in the manufacturer-employer
situation.
76 284 F. Supp. 740 (E.D. Il. 1967).
77 392 F.2d 918 (7th Cir. 1968).
781394 U.S. at 412.

79 The employer's liability could have amounted to as much as $70,000, but the Illinois
Wrongful Death Act, ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 70, § 2 (Supp. 1970), placed a ceiling on the
widow's recovery, and thus the employer's subrogation rights, at $30,000.
"'See 2 LARSON, supra note 7, § 76.22, at 250.9.
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subrogation for the employer"' have generally denied recovery by
the employer on the ground that an equitable remedy such as
2
subrogation will not be made available to a negligent party.
Since the obligations of the two parties to the injured workman
are based on different rights and are intended to compensate for
different losses, these courts have held that no undue benefit has
been conferred upon the third party by the employer's payment of
workmen's compensation benefits. 8 3 Because each party has discharged only his own independent liability, there has been no
unjust enrichment of the third-party manufacturer. In finding that
restitution should not be allowed to the employer, one court has
reasoned:
[A]n employer making payment under the [workmen's compensation act] fulfills only his own contractual obligation; he
does not in any way satisfy the third party tort-feasor's liability to the employee ....The liability of the third-party
tort-feasor to the employee still exists.., notwithstanding the
fact that the employee has made a recovery from the Fund.
[I]f the loss insured against is not the same loss for
which plaintiff [the employee] had a right of action against the
wrong-doer, the defendant [the employer] had no right of
84
subrogation to such claims."
Among those jurisdictions allowing subrogation by statute, a
respectable minority has undertaken to apportion the loss be81 See note 36 and accompanying text supra. For a period of time during 1952 and 1953,

Illinois had no right of subrogation when a portion of its workmen's compensation statute
was held unconstitutional, but common-law subrogation was allowed in the case of Geneva
Constr. Co. v. Martin Transfer and Storage Co., 4 11. 2d 273, 122 N.E.2d 540 (1954).
82 See generally Note, Workmen's Compensation: Should A Contributorily Negligent
Employer Be Subrogated?, 42 IND. L.J. 430, 434 (1967); H. MCCLINTOCK, THE PRINCIPLES OF EQUITY § 123 (1948).
83Crab Orchard Improvement Co. v. Chesapeake & 0. Ry., 115 F.2d 277 (4th Cir.
1940), held that where an employee was struck by a coal car being pushed by an engine of
the defendant, he was entitled to retain both the workmen's compensation award and the
tort recovery from the railroad. The employer's attempt to recoup the $4,000 paid or the
$11,000 in increased rates resulting from the accident was not allowed. In Fischer
Construction Co. v. Stroud, 175 Ohio St. 31, 34, 191 N.E.2d 164, 166 (1963), the
employer's suit to recover $27,515 in increased insurance rates out of the employee's
third-party recovery was denied, the court saying that
[A]n employer cannot recover from any source any sum to reimburse him for
an increased amount paid as a premium under the Workmen's Compensation
Act due to the death of an employee, although such death was caused by the
act of a third party.
See also, Hardman, The Common-Law Right of Subrogation Under Workmen's Compensation Acts, 26 W. VA. L.Q. 183 (1920).
8Crab Orchard Improvement Co. v. Chesapeake & O, Ry., 115 F.2d 277, 280-81 (4th
Cir. 1940) (citation omitted).
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tween the employer and the third party by means of contribution.
Although the bases for the decisions and the means effectuating
cross-payments differ among the jurisdictions, Pennsylvania, California, North Carolina, and South Carolina grant the third party
relief from the negligent employer's attempt at subrogation85 and
in this manner prevent the employer from passing on his total
liability under the terms of the workmen's compensation statutes.
Courts in California, North Carolina, and South Carolina have
allowed the third party to defeat the claim of a negligent employer
for reimbursement and allowed a set off against the tort recovery
in the amount of the workmen's compensation award.8 6 The result
of this procedure, predicated in part upon the legislature's enactment of provisions allowing contribution among joint tortfeasors 1 7 retained the deterrent and risk-spreading benefits of the
workmen's compensation acts while guaranteeing the fixed liability ceiling of the employer0 8 The Pennsylvania Supreme Court
allowed contribution between the negligent employer and the third
party8 9 on the basis of what was held to be the legislature's intent
in enacting a joint tortfeasors statute? ° The court held that since
85 See 2 LARSON, supra note 7,
86Witt v. Jackson, 57 Cal. 2d

§ 76.22, at 250.2.
57, 17 Cal. Rptr. 369, 366 P.2d 641 (1961); Lovette v.
Lloyd, 236 N.C. 663, 73 S.E.2d 886 (1953); American Casualty Co. of Reading, Pa. v.
South Carolina Gas Co., 124 F. Supp. 30 (W.D.S.C. 1954); Essick v. City of Lexington,
233 N.C. 600, 65 S.E.2d 220 (1951), in which the court allowed the third party to plead
the contributory negligence of the employer as a defense to a suit for reimbursement of the
workmen's
compensation costs.
87
CAL. CIV. PRO. CODE §§875-880 (West Supp. 1972); N.C. GEN. STAT. § IB-I
(1969).
88
Witt v. Jackson, 57 Cal. 2d 57, 72, 17 Cal. Rptr. 369, 377, 366 P.2d 641,649, (1961);
Lovett v. Lloyd, 236 N.C. 663, 669-70, 73 S.E.2d 886, 891-92 (1953). Note the
discussion of this point in Baccile v. Halcyon Lines, 187 F.2d 403, 406 (3d Cir. 1951),
rev'd, 342 U.S. 282 (1952), an admiralty case in which the jury verdict charging the
employer with 75 percent of the costs of the accident was lowered by the district court to
50 percent under the moiety principle of admiralty law. The court of appeals then reduced
the award to the amount of the workmen's compensation award. 187 F.2d at 406. The
Supreme Court ultimately denied all recovery, placing the entire cost on the third party.
342 U.S. at 287.
89See Maio v. Fahs, 339 Pa. 180, 14 A.2d 105 (1940). The Pennsylvania Supreme
Court, per Justice Roberts, stated in Elston v. Industrial Lift Truck Co., 420 Pa. 97, 102
n.2, 216 A.2d 318, 320 n.2 (1966):
Implicit in these [prior Pennsylvania] holdings is the view that the definition
of "joint-tortfeasors" does not require that they have a common liability
toward the injured party but only that their combined conduct be the cause of
the injury.
Compare this statement with the language of PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 12, § 2082 (1967), which
specifies that "the term 'joint tortfeasors' means two or more persons jointly or severally
liable in tort for the same injury to persons or property." (emphasis added).
90 The earlier statutes upon which the Pennsylvania cases were based has since evolved
into the UNIFORM CONTRIBUTION AMONG JOINT TORTFEASORS ACT, PA. STAT. ANN. tit.
12, §§ 2082- 89 (1967). For an example of the cases disputing this interpretation of these
acts, see Baltimore Transit Co. v. State, 183 Md. 647, 682, 39 A.2d 858, 862 (1944),
where the court said that the difficulties posed by an action for indemnity under both the
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both parties were concurrently negligent, if not jointly liable, the
statutory contribution should be imposed, although it would otherwise have been prohibited by the terms of the workmen's compensation act.9 1 By limiting the amount of contribution to the
extent of the employer's liability under the workmen's compensation act,9 2 the social policies underlying both enactments

were retained while preserving both the full extent of the injured
party's recovery and the employer's limited liability? 3
Murray v. United States9 4 demonstrates another alternative for
eliminating the inequitable burdens imposed by the statutory liability of the employer and the tort liability of the third party. In
Murray a federal court of appeals indicated that an employee's
acceptance of workmen's compensation benefits from his employer could exhaust half of his total cause of action; consequently,
any recovery against the third party who was separately liable
should be diminished by one-half.9 5 Professor Larson indicates,
however, that the decision is of dubious precedential value and
...
96 by apporprovides a result that is "clearly unacceptable.
tioning the cost of the injury between the culpable parties at the
97
expense of the injured party.
workmen's compensation and contribution acts "cannot be resolved under existing Maryland Statutes; the matter is one for legislative consideration."
91
See 2 LARSON, supra note 7, § 76.22, at 250.2 for a description of the mechanics of
the application of the Pennsylvania rule vis-A-vis the North Carolina and California rule.
92 In Brown v. Dickey, 397 Pa. 454, 459, 155 A.2d 836, 839 (1959), the court held that
the liability of an employer who was found by the jury to have been "equally negligent"
was limited to the amount of the workmen's compensation award, stating that "the
appellant's equitable right, bolstered by the Uniform Act must bow to the statutory right of
the employer-appellee to be free from common law liability." Professor Larson criticizes
this as an arbitrary limitation. Larson, Workmen's Compensation: Third Party's Action
OverAgainst
Employer, 65 Nw. U.L. REV. 351, 364 (1970).
93
Larson hypothesizes that were a court free to start with a "clean slate," the Pennsylvania rule for contribution "would probably be the fairest available compromise in light of
all the conflicting policy interests." 2 LARSON, supra note 7, at 363. Professor Riesenfeld,
retaining the metaphor in Workmen's Compensation and Other Social Legislation: The
Shadow of Stone Tablets, 53 CAL. L. REV. 207, 217 (1965), seems to reject the suggestion that recovery-over, limited by the amount of the compensation award, is "the most
equitable distribution," by writing that
A system which leads to an equitable division of the whole loss, according to
the degree of culpability of the parties might ultimately be a fairer solution
[although] such an apportionment would produce considerable practical
difficulties in its administration.
94405 F.2d 1361 (D.C. Cir. 1968).
95Rather than being based upon a law authorizing contribution among joint tortfeasors,
as have been most attempts to mitigate the burden of the third party, the Murray decision
seems to rely upon the single cause of action theory common to subrogation in this area
(see note 37 supra) and a rule dealing with compensation and covenants not to sue. Id. at
1365. See Note, Settlement with One Joint Tortfeasor Bars Recovery Against Others of
the Settling Tortfeasor'sProportionateShare of Damages, 19 Sw. L.J. 650 (1965).
96 2 LARSON, supra note 7, § 76.22, at 250.8.
97 If an injured employee has recovered $ 10,000 in workmen's compensation benefits
from his employer and receives a judgment of $50,000 in tort from the third party, he
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Although such decisions clearly represent the minority view,
the extremism of the Murray decision and the relatively recent
attempt by a federal court in Rhode Island to adopt the Pennsylvania rule 98 constitute "strong evidence that some device ought to
be found to arrive at a compromise of the interests of employer
and third party in this class of cases." 99
C. LegislativeAction
The problems involved in a just apportionment of the cost of
the damages necessarily entailed in the course of carrying on an
enterprise arise from the fact that third-party actions between
joint tortfeasors were simply not contemplated by the drafters of
the workmen's compensation laws.' 0 0 The bar to actions against
the employer was intended as a quid pro quo for the absolute
liability of the employer,' 1 and was probably never thought of as
having application to the third-party situation, let alone the situwould be held to forfeit $25,000 of the $50,000 since one-half of his total cause of action
was directed against the employer from whom he has already recovered. Thus, under the
Murray rule the employee would be awarded a total of $35,000 as opposed to the $50,000
he would have recovered under either the majority rule or the rules followed in California,
North Carolina, and Pennsylvania. In Ohio and West Virginia, where equitable subrogation would be denied the employer, the injured worker would recover a total of $60,000.
Note that the effect of the Murray decision would approximate the result in the earlier
workmen's compensation statutes where the worker was required to elect to apply his
cause of action to either the employer or the third party. The election requirements have
been generally discredited and eliminated from the statutes, however, because of their
undermining of the basic rationale of the laws. See 2 LARSON, supra note 7, § 73, at
226.64-.78; Behrendt, The Rationale of the Election of Remedies Under Workmen's
Compensation Acts, 12 U. CHI. L. REV. 231 (1945); James Social Insurance and Tort
Liability, supra note 51, at 543.
98
Newport Air Park, Inc, v. United States, 293 F. Supp. 809 (D.R.I. 1968), rev'd, 419
F.2d 342, 345 (1st Cir. 1969), the adoption of the Pennsylvania rule being seen as
"impermissible ad hoc legislation." The district court had sought to adopt the Pennsylvania rule on the grounds that
(1)it preserves the economics of the compensation system; (2) it effectuates
the policy of contribution which the passage of the uniform law [R.I. Gen.
Laws Ann. § 10-6-2] suggests; (3) it harmonizes the compensation law with
the law of contribution; and (4) it protects the nonemployer tortfeasor from
the possible gross inequity of carrying the whole liability for wrongs caused
in perhaps major part by the employer tortfeasor.
293 F. Supp. at 815. See also Rowe v. John C. Motter Printing Press Co., 273 F. Supp.
363 (D.R.I. 1967), where Judge Day decided that under Rhode Island's contribution
statute no recovery could be allowed against the employer.
992 LARSON,supra note 7, § 76.22, at 250.8-.9.
1o Regarding the enactment of the Federal Employee's Compensation Act, 5 U.S.C.
§§ 8101 et seq. (1970), the Supreme Court stated in Weyerhaeuser S.S. Co. v. United
States, 372 U.S. 597, 601 (1963), that "Ithere is no evidence whatever that Congress was
concerned with the rights of unrelated third parties..." when the act was considered. See
S. REP. No.836, 81st Cong., Ist Sess. 23 (1949); 1949 U.S. CODE CONG. SERVICE 212; 2
LARSON, supra note 7, § 76.53, at 250.87.
1o1See, e.g., Federal Marine Terminals, Inc. v. Burnside Shipping Co., 394 U.S. 404,
413 (1969).
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ation where it is a negligent employer that is attempting to sue the
third party. 0 2 The early decisions involving the negligent employer may have been thought justified, in spite of the inapplicability
of the statutes, by a belief that the third party's negligence foreclosed him from complaining about unfair treatment. However, in
the products liability area, where strict liability does not necessarily imply the presence of negligence, this rationale also fails. It
is for these reasons that the majority rule has achieved less than
03
equitable results
Courts which have sought to effect a compromise by placing a
share of the burden of the recovery on the employer have generally been forced to analogize to laws and systems more consistent
with notions of sharing liability among those at fault. Thus some
courts have relied upon statutes permitting contribution between
joint tortfeasors in derogation of the common-law rule as evidence
of the direction in which the legislatures would most likely have
gone had they considered the problem in the context of workmen's compensation. 10 4 Similarly, the Murray court considered
the problem as closely analogous to a covenant not to sue a joint
°5
tortfeasor following the settlement of the claim against him.'
The principal case denying subrogation in those states that do not
have statutory subrogation relies in large part upon a discussion of
the subrogation and indemnification rights existing under an accident or life insurance contract. 10 6
If the courts continue to look toward collateral legislative activity for guidelines in their determinations of the problems created
by the lack of an explicit workmen's compensation law, they may
very well turn to the recently enacted Occupational Safety and
Health Act of 1970 (Act).10 7 The enactment of this measure may
indicate a desire on the part of Congress to place an increased
emphasis on the deterrence of industrial accidents in the place of
employment 0 8 Although the Act disavows any effect on the tort
02

See note 100 supra.
10 3 See notes 53-65 and accompanying text supra.
104 See notes 86-93 and accompanying text supra.
105 See notes 94-95 and accompanying text supra.
'06Crab
Orchard Improvement Co. v. Chesapeake & 0. Ry., 115 F.2d 277, 281 (4th
Cir. 1940).
107 29 U.S.C. §§ 651- 678 (1970).
08
'
The language of the Act in § I states that
The Congress declares it to be its purpose and policy... to assure so far as
possible every man and woman in the Nation safe and healthful working
conditions ... (1) by encouraging employers and employees in their efforts to
reduce the number of occupational safety and health hazards at their places
of employment, and to stimulate employers and employees to institute new
and to perfect existing programs for providing safe and healthful working
conditions.
29 U.S.C. § 65 1(b) (1970).
1
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liability of the employer, 10 9 it does renew the obligation of the
employer to furnish his employees with "employment and a place
of employment which are free from recognized hazards that are
causing or likely to cause death or serious physical harm to his
employees." 1 10
A further provision of the Act creates a Workmen's Compensation Commission to study and evaluate different aspects of

the various state workmen's compensation systems 1 11 Regrettably, the problem of allocating among joint tortfeasors the burden

of recovery for injury is not one of the enumerated topics for
study by the Commission.1 1 2 Nonetheless the Commission may
give some attention to the issues of the statutory bar to tort
liability and the express right of subrogation which arise after the

109

Id.

§ 653(b)(4).

110 Id. § 654(a)(1). This provision is similar in scope to § I(e) of the Walsh-Healy Act,
41 U.S.C. § 35(e) (1970), which has required that material furnished under government
contracts shall not be
manufactured or fabricated in any plants, factories, buildings, or surroundings
or under working conditions which are unsanitary or hazardous or dangerous
to the health and safety of employees ....
M The purpose of the Workmen's Compensation Commission is to make
an effective study and objective evaluation of State workmen's compensation
laws in order to determine if such laws provide an adequate, prompt, and
equitable system of compensation for injury or death arising out of or in the
course of employment.
29 U.S.C.
§ 676(a)(2) (1970).
2
11 The topics for study and evaluation by the Commission include, but are not limited
to:
(A) the amount and duration of permanent and temporary disability benefits
and the criteria for determining the maximum limitations thereon, (B) the
amount and duration of medical benefits and provisions insuring adequate
medical care and free choice of physician, (C) the extent of coverage of
workers, including exemptions based on numbers or type of employment, (D)
standards for determining which injuries or diseases should be deemed compensable, (E) rehabilitation, (F) coverage under second or subsequent injury
funds, (G) time limits on filing claims, (H) waiting periods, (1) compulsory or
elective coverage, (J) administration, (K) legal expenses, (L) the feasibility
and desirability of a uniform system of reporting information concerning
job-related injuries and diseases and the operation of workmen's compensation laws, (M) the resolution of conflict of laws .... (N) the extent to
which private insurance carriers are excluded from supplying workmen's
compensation coverage and the desirability of such exclusionary practices, to
the extent they are found to exist, (0) the relationship between workmen's
compensation on the one hand, and old-age, disability, and survivors insurance and other types of insurance, public or private, on the other hand, (P)
methods of implementing the recommendations of the Commission.
Id. § 676(d)(1).
The Commission submitted its report on July 31, 1972. The report does not mention the
problem of subrogation but does recommend the creation of a federal workmen's compensation commission, the duties of which would include the analysis of areas which the
current commission could not examine adequately. NATIONAL COMMISSION
WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION LAWS, REPORT 126 (1972).
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injured party has recovered. Judges 113 and writers1 14 who have
sensed that courts are not able to make decisions based upon a
statute that is inappropriate for this multiparty situation have
called for legislative reform. It is clearly time for a body such as
this Commission to study the full effects of those devices designed
to guard the rights of an employer which have been utilized to
shift the cost of liability. 115 The culmination of any comprehensive study should be recommended statutory reform.
It is inappropriate to use the relative fault of the parties to
justify subrogation where the employer is blameless. Conversely,
it is equally inappropriate to ignore the concept of relative fault on
the basis of laws that were not meant to apply to the situation
where the employer is negligent but the third party is not. In a
branch of the law predicated upon liability without fault, it is
essential that the degree to which fault is to be considered in the
apportionment of any recovery between two enterprises be consistent with the social goals that such a system hopes to attain.' 1 6
The basic rationales advanced for both workmen's compensation
and strict liability are that these are means by which redress might
be efficiently made for injuries incurred as the inevitable result of
conducting a business, at a minimal cost to any one party, and
with the highest potential for deterrence. Any revision of the
workmen's compensation laws would have to emphasize these
justifications in order to resolve the problem of equitable apportionment. Operation consistent with the theories underlying enterprise liability is a goal that must be attained even at the cost of
denying automatic statutory subrogation to the employer or of
eliminating foreclosure of the third party's claim.
A revision would logically extend to the situation where the
employer does not share with the third-party manufacturer any
113 The Supreme Court in Halcyon Lines v. Haenn Ship Ceiling & Refitting Corp., 342
U.S. 282, 286 (1952) stated that "legislative consideration and action can best bring about
a fair accomodation of the diverse but related interests of these groups." This case
involved the Longshoremen's and Harbor Workers' Compensation Act, 33 U.S.C.
§§ 901-950 (1970), which provides that
The liability of an employer... shall be exclusive and in place of all other
liability of such employer to the employee, his legal representative, husband
or wife, parents, dependents, next of kin, and anyone otherwise entitled to
recover damages... on account of such injury or death.
Id. at § 905. See also Baltimore Transit Co. v. State, 183 Md. 674, 682, 39 A.2d 858, 862
(1944).
14
1 2 LARSON, supra note 7, § 76.22, at 250.9, and §76.53, at 250.87; Note, Contribution and Indemnity: The Effect of Workmen's Compensation Acts, 42 VA. L. REV. 959,
976 (1956); McCoid, supra note 5, at 445.
115 See note 59 and accompanying text supra.
1 18
See notes 18-20 and accompanying text supra.
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blame for the accident. Nearly all authorities believe that in this
case the employer should be allowed to recoup the cost of the
workmen's compensation award in a suit against the third party. 1 17 However, an analysis of the liability of the parties from the
standpoint of social insurance reveals no real difference from the
case in which they share the fault. The manufacturer is strictly
liable in tort, and the employer is liable under the workmen's
compensation statute. The policies behind the increased level of
liability to both of these enterprises are unchanged, for these
policies spread the cost of doing business as thinly as possible and
maintain a deterrent effect on the industries.
A plausible explanation for the near unanimity of result where
the employer shares no culpability for the injury is that the legislatures, in compromising the basic precepts of statutory liability by
allowing equitable subrogation, have adhered to the common-law
belief that the burden of making the victim whole should be put
onto the wrongdoer whenever possible."" 8 This compromise undermines the benefits of the enterprise liability system to a considerable extent. While this combination of liability and subrogation
does not deny the injured party his right to a swift and efficient
recovery, which is the prime concern of any form of social insurance, it does have the adverse effect of allowing the employer
to receive a windfall by the presence of a third party. There is no
justification for avoiding the statutory liability present in the theory of workmen's compensation except by reference to the common-law concepts of fault made inapplicable to the employer
when he became subject to the statutory liability. 1 9 Allowing the
employer to enter into the suit and attempt to shift his costs by
means of subrogation, Professor James says,
tends to be wasteful in a society whose judicial machinery is
117 See, e.g., 2 LARSON, supra note 7, § 74.31, at 226.105-. 118. Professor James seems
to be the only dissenter, arguing that once the injured party has recovered from both the
employer and the third party
the interest of society will generally be served best by leaving matters as they
are at this point. Some of the objectives of the law have certainly been
achieved. The injured person has already been compensated, and at least a
portion of his loss shifted to a party who has or will distribute it widely
according to insurance principles and is peculiarly well equipped to perform
that function. To this extent a condition of equilibrium has been reached.
Any further shifting of loss will disturb it ....
James, Social Insurance and Tort Liability, supra note 5 I, at 557.

118 See note 60 supra.

119 Certainly the employer is obligated to provide workmen's compensation payments in
those cases where the employer is not at fault but no third party is involved. This is the
essence of the workmen's compensation system: a swift and assured recovery for all
accidents in exchange for a limitation of the amount of the employer's liability. See note 17
supra.
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already overtaxed. It is often allowed in situations where it
simply takes money from one of a man's pockets and puts it
in one of his other's [sic], or where cross-claims for subrogation will occur frequently and cancel out. It sometimes takes
a loss out of machinery for distributing it and throws it back
onto an individual who cannot distribute losses at all. It
probably accomplishes little of the admonitory function. It is
120
an inappropriate weapon for punishment.
A system of absolute liability that can only be applied to
modern enterprise by analogy to the common law is, to a large
extent, self-defeating. The efforts of the courts to interpret inapplicable laws have resulted in a lessening of the benefits intended to be provided. 1 21 The cases indicate unneeded complexity
and a considerable degree of inequity as a result of indiscriminate
doses of what is meant to be common-law justice. 12 2 In the
third-party action, either where the employer is concurrently responsible for the injury or where he is not at fault, a more
satisfactory result would be reached if the law were to reject any
concern with fault on the part of the employer and concentrate on
his statutory liability. A purer system of enterprise liability would
be better able to fulfill the needs of the employer, the third party,
and society as a whole, without sacrificing any benefit to the
injured workman.
IV. CONCLUSION
Professor Ehrenzweig laments the fact that "the 'common
sense of an industrial society' had to make its way within the law
of negligence 'against minds steeped in the absolutes of a once
common law.' ",123 There can be no doubt that this is precisely the
problem existing in the situation that has been discussed. In the
absence of adequate statutory guidance the courts have been
forced to fill the gaps in the development of enterprise liability by
analogy to portions of the common law which have become inappropriate. Legislative action is clearly required to provide a firm
basis for this area of injury law. Any proposed measure should
attempt to be totally consonant with the ideals of modern enterprise liability, rather than loosely and indiscriminately tied to
principles of fault that have been rejected in the industrial setting.
120 James, Social Insurance and Tort Liability, supra note 5 I, at 563.

notes 58- 64 and accompanying text supra.
See notes 58-60 and accompanying text supra.
I" EHRENZWEIG, supra note 6, § 16, at 55.
121 See
22
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The need is for action that would necessitate a reevaluation of the
requirements of society and the positions of the parties in an
attempt to reach a solution whereby the cost of injuries suffered in
the course of employment is placed upon those who are most able
to bear the burden in an efficient and equitable manner.
-John A. Payne, Jr.

